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In the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah 
GA YLAND, a Utah Corporation, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH; LAMONT B. GUNDER-
SEN, EDWIN Q. CANNON, SR., 
and WILLIAM G. LARSON, In-
dividually and as members of 
the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Salt Lake County. 
Appellants. 
CASE 
No. 9280 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant refers to the Statement of Facts as 
Contained in Appellant's original brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE RECORD CONTAINS NO EVI-
DENCE CONCERNING WHETHER SALT LAKE 
COUNTY. HAS OR HAS NOT ADOPTED A MASTER 
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PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION, AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD NOT NOW INVALIDATE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY'S ORDINANCES ON THE BASIS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS FINDING IN THAT 
REGARD. 
POINT II: THE VALIDITY OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCES IS NOT CONDI-
TIONED UPON NOR AFFECTED BY THE ADOP-
TION OF A MASTER PLAN FOR LAND UTIUZA-
TION OR F AlLURE THEREOF. 
POINT III: IF A MASTER PLAN IS A PRE-
REQUISITE TO ZONING AND THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF A MASTER PLAN ARE NOT MET, AS CON-
TENDED BY RESPONDENT, RESPONDENT STILL 
HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY THE OMISSION 
THEREOF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD. CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE 
WHETHER SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS OR HAS NOT 
ADOPTED A MASTER PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZA-
TION, AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT NOW IN-
VLIDATE SALT LAKE COUNTY'S ORDINANCES ON 
THE BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS 
FINDING IN THAT REGARD. 
· ··At page 20 of its brief, respondent argues that: 
"It is conceded in the pleadings and was 
admitted by counsel in the court below that 
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Salt Lake County has not complied with the 
law in regard to establishing a master plan 
and holding hearings thereon." 
First it should be noted that respondent does 
not cite us to a record of any admission of appel-
lant's counsel that Salt Lake County has failed to 
adopt a master plan. It is submitted that a reading of 
the record herein discloses no such admission. 
As to whether or not appellant conceded that 
point in its pleadings, we refer to paragraph 9 of 
respondent's complaint wherein it is alleged: 
"Title 8 of Salt Lake County ordinances 
covering zoning and planning and the en-
tirety thereof and in particular Chapter 8-18-1 
thereof are unlawful and illegal for the fol-
lowing reasons.'' 
And subparagraph "C" of paragraph 9 which 
elaborates on that allegation as follows: 
"The Salt Lake County Planning Com-
mission has not adopted any master plan cov-
ering or affecting the matter of land use 
within this County.'' 
Appellant's response to said allegation is contained 
in paragraph 7 of its answer as follows: 
"In answer to paragraph 9, defendants 
deny that Title 8 of the Salt Lake County or-
dinances or any part thereof is unlawful or 
illegal for the reasons alleged or for any other 
reason whatsoever." 
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It is submitted that appellant's answer was ob-
viously intended to and did constitute a general 
denial of the allegations of paragraph 9 of respon-
dent's complaint, and cannot fairly be interpreted 
as a concession that Salt Lake County has not 
adopted a master plan. Appellant is unable to lo-
cate another provision in the pleadings that might 
be interpreted as a concession on that point. 
There being no evidence on the question of 
whether or not Salt Lake County has adopted a 
master plan, the court below erred in its finding 
that it had not, and this court should not now find 
that Salt Lake County zoning ordinances are invalid 
based upon that erroneous finding. 
POINT II 
THE VALIDITY OF SALT LAKE COUNTY ZON-
ING ORDINANCES IS NOT CONDITIONED UPON 
NOR AFFECTED BY THE ADOPTION OF A MAS-
TER PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION OR FAILURE 
THEREOF. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 17-27-l provides as 
follows: 
"The boards of countv commissioners of 
the respective counties Within the state are 
authorized and empowered to provide for 
the physical development of the unincorpor-
ated territory within the county and for the 
zoning of all or any part of such unincorpor-
ated territory in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided." (Emphasis added) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
It should be noted that the county commission-
ers are empowered to provide for two things, the 
physical development and zoning. This matter some-
how escaped the respondent, for in his complaint, 
at paragraph 9-a, it refers to that same provision 
but omits the objectionable part as follows: 
"Section 17-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, grants to the board o£ county commis-
sioners of the counties in the State of Utah 
the power to zone all or any part of the unin-
corporated territory within the county in the 
manner provided in succeeding sections." 
The succeeding sections of Chapter 27 provide 
various ways in which the physical development 
of the county may be accomplished, one of which 
is the adoption of a master plan. 
17-27-4, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in 
part as follows: 
" . . . the master plan of a county with 
the accompanying maps, plats, charts and 
descriptive and explanatory matter shall show 
the county planning commission's recom-
mendations for the development of the ter-
ritory covered by the plan, and may include, 
among other things, the general location, 
character and extent of streets or roads, via-
ducts, bridges, parkways, playgrounds, for-
ests, reservations, parks, airports, and other 
public ways, grounds, places and spaces; the 
general location and extent of public utili-
ties and terminals whether publicly or pri-
vately owned, for water, light, power, sanita-
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tion, transportation, communication, heat and 
other purposes; the acceptance, widening, re-
moval, extension, relocation, narrowing, va-
cation, abandonment, or change of use of any 
of the foregoing public ways, grounds, places, 
space.s, properties, utilities, or terminals; ... " 
(emphasis added) 
From this it seems clear that the purpose of 
the master plan is to provide a plan or guide for 
the construction and installation of public improve-
ments. No mention is made in his section of any 
provisions for zoning. 
17-27-6, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, provides in 
part that: 
''The master plan shall be available for 
public inspection in the office of the planning 
commission at all reasonable times, but its 
purpose and effect shall be solely to aid the 
planning commission in the performance of 
its duties." 
Chapter 27 then provides still another aid to 
the county commissioners in providing for the phy-
sical development of the county; i.e., an official map. 
Title 17, chapter 27, U.C.A., 1953, then provides 
in a series of sections, 17-27-9 to 17-27-19, indepen-
dent of any foregoing sections except 17-27-1, that 
counties may make a zoning plan; that said plan 
should be certified to the county commission; that 
there should be a public hearing thereon; and after 
the foregoing, for the regulation of land use by zon-
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7: 
ing. No mention is made of a requirement that there 
should first be adopted a "master plan." 
17-27-20, U.C.A., 1953, makes it clear that two 
distinct kinds of plans are comprehended when it 
provides: 
"Before finally adopting and certifying 
any plan, either master or zoninq, the plan-
ning commission, regional county or district, 
making such plan, shall submit such plan to 
the state planning commission for advice and 
recommendations." (emphasis added) 
Nowhere is there any indication that one plan 
was intended to be dependent upon the other, but 
respondent would have us believe that the "Zoning 
Plan" is merely part of the "Master Plan," when re-
spondent describes it as the " ... zoning portion of 
the master plan." (R-18) 
The remaining sections oi Title 17, Chapter 27, 
U.C.A., 1953, provide still another means whereby 
the county commissione:rs can provide for the phy-
sical development of the county; i.e., the regulation 
of subdivisions. 
In its brief at the top of Page 20, respondent 
emphasizes the words "from and after the time", 
followed by the unemphasized words "the county 
planning commission of any county, in accordance 
with the procedure hereinabove specified, makes, 
adopts, and certifies to the board of county com-
missioners a plan or plans for zoning the unincor-
porated territory within the county, or any part 
thereof, including both the full text of a zoning 
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resolution and the maps, and after public hearing 
thereon, then the board of county commissioners, 
may by resolution regulate in any portion or por-
tions of such county . . . etc," seemingly implying 
that the requirement has not been met. While, as in 
the case of the master plan, there is no evidence on 
that point, appellant now asserts that all of those 
requirements and indeed all prerequisites to zoning 
regulation by the county have been met. 
Respondent at page 21 of its brief points out 
that: 
"Whenever such a requirement for a 
master plan exists and where it has not been 
met the courts have with uniformity held that 
the zoning powers may not be exercised." 
(emphasis added) 
It then cites several cases to that effect. Appel-
lant agrees with this statement but points out that 
a master plan is not a requirement in Utah, that a 
zoining plan apparently is a requirement, and that 
such a plan has been adopted. The reference to the 
requirement of a plan in the cases cited by respon· 
dent, if they have a counterpart in Utah law, are 
similar to our requirement to a zoning plan and not, 
it is submitted, to a master plan which appellant 
points out is merely authorized as a guide to the 
planning commission and is not made a prerequi-
site to any action of either the planning or county 
commissions. 
At this point, appellant will incorporate in its 
brief Appendix A, a reproduction of a recent dis--
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cussion of the present problem which it believes will 
be of interest to the court. 
The article being reproduced in whole, appel-
lant will not now editorialize upon it except to say 
that by its submission appellant does not ask the 
court to legislate away whatever requirements our 
existing statutes impose upon us. Appellant takes 
the position that all that is required has been done. 
In addition appellant points out that the statutes un-
der attack by respondent are to be applied to all 
counties o~ the state. If the court finds that the pre-
requisites to zoning are so severe that Salt Lake 
Couny has been unable to comply, the smaller 
counties of the state face an impossible burden. 
POINT III 
IF A MASTER PLAN IS A PREREQUISITE TO 
ZONING AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MASTER 
PLAN ARE NOT MET, AS CONTENDED BY RE-
SPONDENT, RESPONDENT STILL HAS NOT BEEN 
PREJUDICED BY THE OMISSION THEREOF. 
Respondent in its brief attacked the conclusion 
of the trial court that: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
''(A) The Board of Salt Lake County Com-
missioners have failed to follow the provi-
sions of the Statutes of the State of Utah in 
regard to the adoption of a master plan for 
land utilization. Such failure, however, does 
not invalidate in total their zoning powers and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
would be grounds for setting aside a zoning 
action only in cases where it appeared froni 
the evidence that the failure to adopt such 
master plan was to the prejudice o£ the in-
stant case. The evidence submitted in this 
case does not establish that such failure pta. 
judiced the substantial rights of the plaintiff 
herein.'' 
Appellant points out that the provisions author-
izing a master plan which respondent interprets as 
a necessary prerequisite to zoning provides at 
17-27-6, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, in part as follows: 
"The master plan shall be available for 
public inspection in the office of the planning 
commission at all reasonable times, but its 
purpose and effect shall be solely to aid the 
planning commission in the performance of 
its duties." 
Inasmuch as the recommendation of the plan-
ning board to the county commissioners was in res-
pondent's favor, respondent can hardly claim that 
it was prejudiced by the failure of the planning com-
mission to have before it a master plan. 
Further respondent urges at the bottom of page 
22 and the top of page 23 of its brief that it was de-
prived of a hearing and an opporunity to protest. 
Appellant points out that respondent did not avail 
itself of this opportunity at the time of the adai} 
tion of the "Zoning Plan", a more appropriate time 
to make such a protest, but, of course, this is anoth-
er matter not in evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant requests 
that this court now declare that a master plan is 
not a prerequisite to Salt Lake County's power to 
zone; that it af£irm the trial court's conclusion that 
respondent has not been prejudiced by the omis-
sion of a master plan if such omission exists; and 
in the alternative, if it determines that a master plan 
is a prerequisite to zoning by Salt Lake County, that 
it remand the matter to the trial court for a deter-
mination concerning whether a master plan exists. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
LOUIS M. HAYNIE, and 
GERALD E. NIELSON 
Deputies Civil Division 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
November. 1960 
ZONING DIGEST 
THE "MASTER PLAN"-A STATUTORY 
PREREQUISITE TO A ZONING ORDINANCE? 
David N. McBride and Richard F. Babcock 
II you don't own a horse, wby lrtn 
about putting tbe cart before it1 
It is an exhilirating exercise to criticize 
zoning. The authors yield to no one in oneup-
manship at this; the most popular spectator 
. . sport among planners and zoning lawyers. 
We have, however, decided to file a protest 
. against the ground rule, the general accep-
tance of which is fast becoming catechism: 
that zoning ordinances must by legislative 
ukase be based upon "a master plan." The 
evidence is clear that more state legislators 
are beguiled each year with this "basic prin-
ciple," or, at least, they fear to question this 
sanctified credo. 
Before we are branded as counterrevolu-
tionaries, plotting to defile Bassett, Haar, and 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, we make 
it clear: Zoning should be subordinate to 
planning, and should, therefore, both follow 
and serve that municipal concern. Zoning is 
quote a useful technique provided it is recog-
nized as only one o£ a number of legal tools 
to implement a program for sound and pro-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
gressive community growth unquote. The rub 
is that someone has persuaded legislators that 
if the phrase "master plan" (ah, there, "com-
prehensive") is inserted in the enabling act 
as a prerequisite to zoning, the rest of the job 
is a snap. Even the most benighted local citi-
zenry cannot fail then to incorporate the Good, 
the True, and the Beautiful into its zoning or-
dinance. This, of course, is fiddle-faddle. Per-
sonally, we would rather sweat and groan 
with a group of citizens who, having never 
heard of planning, want a regulatory ordi-
nance to control simple matters like billboards, 
septic tanks on small lots, and strip business 
development than waltz with that sophisticat-
ed band which is confident that once it adopts 
a plan which it characterizes as "master" it 
must follow that the subsequent zoning ordi-
nance can only be perfect. 
If there are meaningful planning princi-
ples, zoning must be based upon them. The 
first and most painful step, however, is to 
enunciate those principles; not to assume 
them and then to make that unchallenged 
premise a legislative prerequisite to the adop-
tion of a regulatory ordinance. The goal more 
appealing to us should be to give one leg 
up to that community which dares to explain 
in its zoning ordinance what it means by plan-
ning, but not to grant each Thomasville, Dix-
on, and Harrisburg the aura of respectability 
by permitting it to veneer its regulatory or-
dinance by codifying a brace of Zip-a-toned 
maps, provided they are labeled "master 
plan.'' 
We propose that all state zoning enabling 
acts abolish (repeat: abolish) the requirement 
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that a zoning ordinance be based upon a 
master plan. Instead, we want to substitute 
· the following: (1) The preamble to each zon-
ing ordinance must state whether or not the 
community has a plan (call it what you like) 
upon which the ordinance is based. (2) If the 
preamble states that _such a plan does exist, 
it must then also state what is encompassed 
by the plan, its precise objectives and its prin-
ciples, the relevant documents which sub-
stantiate the plan, and where copies of these 
documents may be examined by interested 
parties. Before we note the unmistakable ad-
vantages of such a revisionary proposal, it 
might be well to examine the prospect before 
us. 
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce is the 
progenitor of the mandatory dogma,1 although 
it refers to "comprehensive plan," not "master 
plan," about which nicety more later. From 
that source the more enlightened jurisdictions 
drew their statutes. The Connecticut statute 
is illustrative of one branch of the family. It 
requires that zoning regulations "shall be 
made in accordance with a comprehensive 
plan." The statute does not define the phrase. 
(Apparently to do so would be to insist upon 
· footnoting the Ten Commandments.) This 
omission is convenient; another section of 
the same general title of the Connecticut sta-
tufe provides that the plan commission "shall 
prepare, adopt and amend a plan of develop-
ment for the municipality.'' {Emphasis added.) 
Elsewhere in the same title the unmodified 
term "Plan" is used. Use of these varying but 
similar terms has, as any fool could see, led 
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the courts to engage in judicial mah-jongg. 
Cf. ''Levinsky v. Zoning Comm'n of City of 
Bridgeport," 127 A.2d 822 (1956) and "Couch 
v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of Washington,'' 
I 06 A.2d 173, 176 ( 1954). It was predictable 
that a 1959 comprehensive amendment to the 
Connecticut statute did not define the term. 
This same lighthearted practice has been 
followed in the Michigan statute, which uses 
substantially equivalent terms, most of which 
are not defined. The county, the township, and 
the city and village enabling acts each pro-
vide that the zoning ordinance must be based 
upon or be in accordance with a ''plan" de-
signed to promote enumerated objectives of 
zoning. The critical term is not defined. The 
Michigan Plan Commission Act required a 
"master plan," a term left undefined, and 
no specific mention or reference is made to 
the intended relationship (if any) between the 
planning "master plan" and the "plan" which 
must underlie a zoning ordinance. Likewise, 
the county and the cities and towns enabling 
acts of Virginia require the zoning ordinances 
of these governing bodies to be related to a 
"zoning plan" and to a "comprehensive plan,'' 
respectively. Neither term is defined. 
It may be that the confusion which de-
veloped from the term "comprehensive 
plan" is, as Hugh Pomeroy suggests, due to 
a misinterpretation of the purpose of the draft-
ers who intended no more than that a zoning 
ordinance be (a) comprehensive and (b) "rea-
sonable" in the constitutional sense.2 If this 
were where the matter stood, there could be 
no serious objection to such an · innocuous 
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condition precedent except from semanticists 
and conscientious draftsmen. We suspect, 
however, that Mr. Pomeroy rationalizes the in-
tentions of the drafters with greater credit than 
is appropriate.3 More recent legislative devel-
opments indicate that the planners did intend 
something more specific, and, in light of some 
unsatisfactory court decisions, they decided 
to make clear their intentions by changing the 
adjective from the ambiguous "comprehen-
sive" to the purportedly more precise "mas-
ter," and_ defining the term in the statute. All 
this is not too important. The significant de-
velopment is that, as the term has been more 
specifically defined, it has also retained its 
place as a mandatory prerequisite to a zoning 
ordinance. 
One example of this latter-day approach 
is the Indiana Planning and Zoning Act. It 
requires a "master plan" as a condition pre-
cedent to a zoning ordinance and defines such 
a plan as "a complete master plan or any of 
its parts such as a master plan of land use and 
zoning; of thoroughfares; of sanitation; of rec-
reation, and other related matters, and includ-
ing such ordinance and ordinances as may 
be deemed necessary to implement such com-
plete master plan or part thereof by legislative 
approval and provision for such regulations 
as are deemed necessary in their enforce-
ment." The Indiana Act goes on to state that 
the "master plan" may consist of any of 23 
items from land use maps through flood con-
trol to public education demands. 
The inevitable next step was to insist that 
the mandatory plan contain specific elements. 
Thus the state of Washington 1959 county 
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planning enabling act provides that "zoning 
maps as an official ·control may be adopted 
only for areas covered by a comprehensive 
plan containing not less than a land use ele-
ment and a circulation element." (Note here 
the use of the term "comprehensive plan" in 
a context which indicates something more 
than Pomeroy's comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance.) 
Indications are that this latest mandatory 
and explicit technique will be extended to ad-
ditional jurisdictions. The proposed Pennsyl-
vania Zoning Act insists that every zoning 
ordinance ''shall be based and interpreted 
on the basis of the following planning studies: 
(1) Existing Land Use Map, showing the 
location and extent of existing land 
uses throughout the municipality; and 
(2) Proposed Land Use Plan, showing the 
location and extent of planned future 
land uses throughout the municipality; 
and 
(3) Thoroughfare Plan, showing all the 
existing streets in the municipality, 
the major proposed streets, indicating 
them as primary and secondary and 
as opened or unopened.'' 
A current proposal of the Zoning Com-
mittee of the Illinois State Bar Association to 
amend the state planning and zoning acts pro-
vides that only after preparation of a "com-
prehensive plan" may a municipality under-
take a zoning program. The prerequisite "com-
prehensive plan" is not specifically defined, 
but it is required to "consist of coordinated 
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plans for future land use including popula-
tion density and intensity of use, arterial 
streets and highways, and may include, 
among other things (sic), storm or flood water 
run-off channels and basins, plans for public 
lands and improvements, open spaces and 
other amenities, parks, playgrounds and rec-
reational areas, schools, offstreet parking, 
subdivision developments, housing stan-
dards, health and safety standards, building 
and construction standards, blight elimina-
tion, urban renewal and rehabilitation, con-
servation, streets, alleys, public service facili-
ties, sanitation, transportation, communication 
and capital improvements." (Note again the 
use of the term "comprehensive plan.") 
The notable exception to this exercise in 
self-hypnosis is the state of California. The 
California zoning enabling act expressly ne-
gates the necessity of any plan as a prerequi-
site to a zoning ordinance. ("This section does 
not require the adoption of a master plan prior 
to either the initiation or adoption of a zoning 
ordinance.") The California statute provides, 
nevertheless, for the adoption of plans. A 
1955 amendment requires each plan commis-
sion to adopt a "master or general plan" which 
consists of "a map and a statement describ-
ing it and a statement covering objectives, 
principles and standards used to develop it; 
and shall include all of the following ele-
ments: 
(a) A land use element .. . 
(b) A circulation element .. . 
(c) A statement of the standards of popu-
lation density and building intensity 
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recommended for the various districts 
and other territorial units, and esti-
mates of future population growth ... 
(d) Supporting maps, diagrams, charts, 
descriptive material and reports." 
It is then provided that the "master plan" 
may include several named optional ele-
ments. 
The California approach makes sense. It 
acknowledges the responsibility of the legis-
lature (if it insists upon legislating "planning") 
to explain what it means by that phrase. It 
does not, however, insist that this historically 
equivocal term must be a legislative prerequi-
site to a regulatory ordinance. It is our view 
that California should have given a statutory 
credit to those communities who dared to dis-
close the relationship between their zoning 
ordinance and their community plan. 
Our thought is to provide a legislative 
bridge-not a rainbow-over the chasm be-
tween zoning and planning. The structure 
would be usable by those communities who 
are willing to submit the bridge to inspection. 
To say that a municipality cannot adopt 
a zoning ordinance unless it has a "master 
plan" is an invitation to prostitute the concept 
of planning by municipalities which, wishing 
a zoning ordinance, are unable or unwilling 
to expend the funds and energy necessary 
to do an adequate job of planning. If every 
community must have a plan before it can 
regulate, for example, lot sizes, location of 
commercial and residential uses and off-street 
parking, we will see (indeed, we have seenl) 
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a degeneration of planning.4 Nor does it fol-
low that a community cannot have a reason-
ably efficient and fair (and, therefore, consti-
tutional) zoning ordinance unless it has a mas-
. ter plan, as a house can provide shelter and 
yet offend an elementary sense of good 
taste. Let us admit without the fear of under-
cutting a good thing, that it is possible to have 
a zoning ordinance which will accomplish 
many useful things without a pre-existing 
community plan. To make a plan (compre-
hensive, master, or general) mandatory not 
only encourages bastardization of planning, 
but also deprives the conscientious, if impe-
cunious, municipality of the chance to have 
a zoning ordinance. 
Our alternative may resolve this dilemma. 
The preamble to ~ach zoning ordinance must 
state whether or not it is based upon a com-
munity plan, the optional elements of which 
are enumerated in the enabling act. If that 
statement is in the affirmative, the preamble 
must set forth precisely what is meant by that 
"plan." Such requirements indicate a legisla-
tive recognition of the significant relationship 
between zoning and planning. The commu-
nity that adopts a zoning ordinance without 
a plan must make such an admission and, 
such admission being required by the legis-
lature, it follows that this is a material fact in 
any judicial determination as to the reason-
ableness of that ordinance. On the other hand, 
if a plan is claimed, then the drafters of the 
zoning ordinance must disclose on the face 
of the zoning ordinance what they mean by 
that term. Being required to display their 
linen, they must be certain that it bears in-
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spection. On this premise it is reasonable to 
assume they will exercise greater concern 
with genuine cleanliness than would be so if 
the statutory requirement were that no laun-
dry shall be washed without the application 
of a bleach. 
1 See Bair & Bartley, "The Text of a Model Zoning Ordinance," 
4 (2d ed. 1960) 
2 Pomeroy, "Zoning Policies and Policy Statement," 12 Zoning 
Digest, 321, 323 (1960). 
3 Cf. Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1154, 1156 (1955). 
4 The lliinois Planning Act grants a municipality the power to 
regulate subdivisions in the unincorporated area within 
1¥2 miles of its boundaries, provided it has an "official 
plan." Few lllinois planners would deny that this bait has 
been used as an excuse for sloppy, makeshift, irresponsible 
documents labeled "official plan." 
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